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the individual identities of its constituents. Identity politics differs from
many social movements, such as left-wing or fundamentalist Christian
activism, in that the constituents of the former-such as women, Afro
Americans, gay s-are politically marked as individuals. Politics and
personal being are virtually inseparable. This inseparability is owing
largely to the natural production of the political categories. One may by
virtue of reason or impulse join the National Rifle Association or the
Praise the Lord Club. Not so with being a Native American or a Black
Muslim. One simply is, by virtue of nature, tradition, or thrown condi
tion, an Asian-American, a lesbian, or a member of the lower class. And
finally, it is largely by virtue of the "natural" condition of its members
that the groups lay claim to certain inalienable rights-for example,
equal opportunities, equal treatment, freedom to practice, participation
in democratic governance.
For present purposes we may see social constructionism as a range of
dialogues centered on the social genesis of what we take to be knowl
edge, reason, and virtue, on the one side, and on the other the enormous
range of soc ial practices born and/or sustained by these discourses. In
its critical moment, social constructionism is a means of bracketing or
suspending any pronouncement of the real, the reasonable, or the right.
In its generative moment, constructionism offers an orientation toward
creating new futures, an impetus to societal transformation.
Why a love affair between identity politics and social construction
ism? There are many reasons. Among them, the generalized shift toward
social construction in the academy furnished a powerful justificatory
basis for political and moral activism. For the better part of the century,
the academy basked in what it believed to be an ideological nonpartisan
ship. Epitomized by the positivist-empiricist stance in the natural and
social sciences, it held that the function of inquiry is to determine what
is objectively true. Moral and ideological commitment obfuscate the
quest, it was said, yielding bias and misinformation. ("Proper scholar
ship is about truth, not the good.") However, as constructionist critique
challenged claims to objectivity-truth beyond cultural standpoint-so
did it eradicate the is-ought divide. Not only did the discourses of truth,
objectivity, and rationality cease to be commanding rhetorics, but their
claimants seemed guilty of either ignorance (lack of reflection on
implicit ideology) or exploitation (masking self-serving ideology in the
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in democratic governance.
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range of soc ial practices born and/or sustained by these discourses. In
its critical moment, social constructionism is a means of bracketing or
suspending any pronouncement of the real, the reasonable, or the right.
In its generative moment, constructionism offers an orientation toward
creating new futures, an impetus to societal transformation.
Why a love affair between identity politics and social construction
ism? There are many reasons. Among them, the generalized shift toward
social construction in the academy furnished a powerful justificatory
basis for political and moral activism. For the better part of the century,
the academy basked in what it believed to be an ideological nonpartisan
ship. Epitomized by the positivist-empiricist stance in the natural and
social sciences, it held that the function of inquiry is to determine what
is objectively true. Moral and ideological commitment obfuscate the
quest, it was said, yielding bias and misinformation. ("Proper scholar
ship is about truth, not the good.") However, as constructionist critique
challenged claims to objectivity-truth beyond cultural standpoint-so
did it eradicate the is-ought divide. Not only did the discourses of truth,
objectivity, and rationality cease to be commanding rhetorics, but their
claimants seemed guilty of either ignorance (lack of reflection on
implicit ideology) or exploitation (masking self-serving ideology in the

cloak of neutrality). The constructionist assault, then, led to a slow dete
rioration of authority, with the simultaneous liberation of politically and
morally invested inquiry. If one's professional work is inevitably politi
cal, as constructionists reason, then the academician is furnished a new
and inspiring telos. Rather than generating knowledge that may or may
not be used by those making decisions for the society-as the pure sci
entists envisioned their goal-the knowledge-generating process
becomes itself a means of creating the good society. (Women's studies,
black studies and queer studies are exemplary of this impulse.)
Not only did constructionism thus help to incite the political impulse,
but it has also generated a powerful set of implements for societal cri
tique. Constructionist inquiry has demonstrated how claims to the true
and the good are born of historical traditions, fortified by social net
works, sewn together by literary tropes, legitimated through rhetorical
devices, and operate in the service of particular ideologies to fashion
structures of power and privilege. For the sophisticated constructionist,
there are no invulnerable or unassailable positions, no foundational war
rants, no transcendent rationalities or obdurate facts in themselves. Most
important for the present, many of these modes of deconstructing the
opposition are "street-ready"; they can be {and are) paraphrased easily
in the daily argots of political activism.
THE UNRAVELING OF IDENTITY POLITICS
You will not be mistaken if you recognize in these remarks a soupi;on of
nostalgia. These have been times of dizzying excitement, crashing idols,
scintillating discussion, and epiphanies of virtue. I scarcely think the
implications are yet fully explored, nor their action potential exhausted.
However, in my view the enormous force of identity politics, aided and
abetted as it has been by constructionist dialogues, has begun to sub
side. In large measure, this deterioration of efficacy can be understood in
terms of cultural change, change that can in part be traced to the influ
ence of identity politics itself. To take a constructionist stance in this
analysis, let me focus only on the rhetoric of identity politics.
From the outset, the prevailing rhetoric has been of little influence
outside groups of the already-committed. For the targets-those most in
need of "political education"-such rhetoric has more often been alien
ating or counterproductive. By and large, identity politics has depended

on a rhetoric of blame, the illocutionary effects of which are designed to
chastise the target (for being unjust, prejudiced, inhumane, selfish,
oppressive, and/or violent). In Western culture we essentially inherit two
conversational responses to such forms of chastisement-incorporation
or antagonism. The incorporative mode ("Yes, now I see the error of my
ways") requires an extended forestructure of understandings (i.e., a his
tory that legitimates the critic's authority and judgment, and that renders
the target of critique answerable). However, because in the case of iden
tity politics there is no preestablished context to situate the target in just
these ways, the invited response to critique is more typically one of hos
tility, defense, and countercharge.
Such antagonistic replies are additionally invited by virtue of the dif
fering discourse worlds of the critic and target. W hat are viewed as
"exploitative wages" on the one side are branded as "just earnings" on
the other; "prejudicial decisions" on the one side are exonerated as
"decisions by merit" on the other; attempts to combat "exclusionary
prejudices" are seen as disruptions of "orderly and friendly community;"
"rigid parochialism" for the critic is understood as "love of enduring tra
ditions" by the target. Under such conditions, those targeted by the
critiques are least likely to take heed, and most likely to become galva
nized in opposition. As Mary Ann Glendon {1991) argues in Rights Talk,
the rhetoric of rights "polarizes debate; it tends to suppress moral dis
cussion and consensus building. Once an agenda is introduced as 'right,'
sensible discussion and moderate positions tend to disappear."
It should be added that this antagonistic animus is not limited to the
relationship of critic to target but, rather, has carried over significantly
into many of the political movements themselves. W ith the rhetoric of
blame a favored option for dealing with others, it also becomes a hammer
for fixing what is wrong within the political movements. Any movement
that targets, the culture as guilty of suppressing voices will soon find that
within its own ranks some voices are more equal than others. In the
thrust toward economic equality, women tum on men for their patriarchal
disposition; in the drive toward gender equality, white women are found
guilty of silencing the black voice, the educationally privileged guilty of
elitist and exfiusionary language, the straight for politics inimical to the
lesbian, and so on. To illustrate, prominent black intellectual Patricia
Hill Collins (1990) writes of the necessity for a specifically black feminist
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movement. However, she also advocates a "critical posture toward main
stream, feminist, and Black scholarly inquiry" more generally (p .. 12).
Here she joins other prominent black thinkers, along with a cadre of His
panic, Native American, and Asian-American women in challenging
feminism for its implicit racism and its overarching concern with white,
middle-class women's issues.
Not only is the dominant rhetoric of identity politics divisive in its
effects, there are important respects in which it has lost its efficacy by
virtue of its profusion. The rhetoric of rights, for example, has traveled
weightlessly across contexts of contention. W here the most celebrated bat
tles for equality·were fought within the domains of class, race, and gender,
the forms of rhetoric have become available to all who suffer. Rapidly the
big three were joined by Native Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanics,
the aged, the homeless, ex-mental patients, the disabled, gay and lesbian
enclaves; along with advocates for the right to life and children's rights.
We also find litigation based on claims to a right to higher education,
death row inmates to reproduce, and women's rights to urinate in any
public facility. As Amitai Etzioni (1993) proposes: "The incessant
issuance of new rights, like the wholesale printing of currency, causes a
massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims." Glendon
{1991) adds that rights talk contains the "unexpressed premise that we
roam at large in a land of strangers, where we presumptively have no
obligations toward others except to avoid the active infliction of harm."
Other critics are far more scathing. National columnists have even spo�
ken of "the rights babble."
Finally, given its relatively long-standing presence in cultural life,
there has been ample time for the development of effective counter
rhetorics. As Hirschman (1991) points out in The Rhetoric of Reaction,
discursive attempts to thwart social change have a rich history. How
ever, the past several decades have stimulated a new range of
self-insulating rebuttals. There is, for example, the· redoubt of "victim
ization," which proposes that claims to being a victim of oppressive
circumstances are merely excuses to cover failures of inaction or irre
sponsibility. Reactionary critic Charles Sykes (1992) proposes that we
have become a "nation of victims," and that the rhetoric of rights and
blame is responsible for a "decay in the American character." In his
volume, The Abuse Excuse, Alan Dershowitz (1994) claims that we have

become a nation of "sob stories." One of the most powerful rebutting
rhetorics, owing to the fact that it has been appropriated from identity
politics itself, is that of political correctness. So trenchant are the
minorities' critiques of established policies and practices that, in the
targets' eyes, they take on a tyrannical demeanor-thus violating their
rights to tradition and voice. As one commentator recently noted, it may
be one of the first times in the nation's history in which both sides of
political debate lodge their defense in civil liberties. Finally, as antilib
eralist critics such as Michael Sandel (1982) have begun to dismantle
the justification of individual rights, the way has been paved for a
rhetoric of responsibility to replace that of rights. It is this latter
rhetoric that has enabled the communitarian movement to gain such
high cultural visibility.
THE CONSTRUCTIONIST CONUNDRUM

If identity politics were not sufficiently embattled by the vicissitudes of
cultural history, it has also begun to feel a certain suffocating presence
from its constructionist paramour. For, while social constructionism sup
plies vibrant discursive resources for building internal strength and
undermining the opposition, it also play s havoc with central tenets of
identity politics. In particular, constructionism offers strong arguments
against the realism, essentialism, and ethical foundationalism endemic
to much of the discourse of identity politics.
In the first instance, the social critiques developed within identity
politics are typically lodged within a realist discourse, a discourse that
privileges its critique with the capacity for truth beyond perspective. In
characterizing the barriers of class, the glass ceiling, homophobia, the
effects of pornography on rape, and the embryonic fetus as a human
being, for example, claims are being made about the state of nature inde
pendent of our interpretive proclivities. For the constructionist, of
course, such claims are not so much reflections of nature as the outcome
of social process. The descriptions are inherently positioned both histor
ically and culturally, and myriad alternatives are both possible and
creditable from other societal locations. The realist posture is all the
more ironic, the constructionist reasons, because such critiques are often
coupled with a deconstruction of the opposition's objectivity. The con
structed character of the dominant discourse is used by the identity
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politician to pave the way for the marginalized alternative, with the latter
position then treated as if transparent.
Closely related to a problematic realism is the essen tialist presump
tion implicit in much identity politics . To make claims for the rights of
women, chi ldren , the aged, the poor, the insane, and so on typically
implies the existence of an essential entity-a group unified by its dis
t inctive features. The group name is treated as referent ial-derived from
characteristics existing in nature , independent of the n ame itself. For the
constructionist , of course, reference is preeminently a socia l achieve 
ment and thus inherent ly defeasibl e. The reali ty of his tory, ethnicity,
class, and so on is g ene ra ted wi t hin contempo rary c ul tura l li fe, and
could be otherwise. As Henry Louis Gates (1994) proposes, black ness is
"not a material object, an absolute, or an event," but only "a trope." And
lodging the argument in soc ial proc ess, he goes on : "Race is on ly a
sociopoli tical category, nothing more." As this sociopolitical category is
applied to individuals, it also acts as a reductive agent, circumscribing
one's identity, and reducing one's potential to be otherwise. In his Reflec
,
tions of an Affirmative Action Baby, Stephen Carter (199l)proposes that
such labe ls operate as problematic stere otypes, covering over complexi
ties and generating m isleading social po licies (see also Calhoun , 1994).
Finally, constructionist thought also militates against the claims to
e thical foun dations impli cit in m uc4 id entit y pol itics -th a t highe r
ground from which others can so confidently be condemned as inhu
mane , self-ser vi ng, pre judiced , an d unjus t. Const ru ctionist tho ught
painful ly reminds us that we have no transcendent rationale upon which
to rest such accusations, and that our sense of moral indignat ion is itself
a product of historically and cul turally situated traditio ns . And, the con
structionist intones, is it possible that those we excoriate are also living
within traditions that are, for them, suffused with a sense of ethical pri
macy? We find, t hen , that social constructionism is a two-edged sword in
the polit ical arena, potentially as damaging to the wielding hand as to t he
opposition .
THE RELATIONAL TURN IN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

As many now propose, identit y p olitics is reaching an im passe. No
longer does it seem an effective means of securing voice, dignity, and
equality. Should socia l construct ionism now content itself with a more

sedentary scholarly ro le, circulating

filigreed obscurities among its own
kind-culture critique without audience, commentary without commit
ment? My response is already foreshadowed in t he phrasing of these
questions . I have che rished the gains achieved by identity politi��• and
grieve its failings; and for me, if constructionism ceases to be politically
en gaged, it will lose i ts essent ial el an. M ore p ositively, however, I see
significant signs of transform at ion in both identi ty p oli tics and in social
constructionism. In the political arena, for example, left-wing activist
Todd Gitlin (1993) despairs of what has be come of identity p olitics, the
proliferation o f which, he say s: "leads to a turning inward, a grim and
he rmetic bravado cele brat in g vict imization and stylized marginality"
(p. 173). Blac k inte llectuals-Co rnell West, Toni Morrison and Henry
Louis Gates-have also turned critical toward t he past p olitical p os
tures , an d now reson ate with m any o the rs seeking an ev ol utio n in
identity po litics. Let me, then, describe what I feel to be a central �ut
growth of contemporary constructionist thought. We may then consider
how this movement lends itself to a re/visione d political ag enda.
Since their emergence as a self-consc ious force (most prominently in
the 1970s), soci al constructionists have largely been deconstructive in
their aims and effects. By demonstrating the social, linguistic, rheto ri
cal, ideo lo gic al, c u ltu ral and his to ric a l for ces resp onsible for
generating the world of knowledge-both professional and everyday
t h ey have c ha lle nged al l c la ims to autho rity, truth, rati onality, and
moral superiority. They have been highly effective forces for extending
rights for negotiat ing the re al and the good. But while this enterprise
must an d should continue, alone it is insufficient. It is insufficient in
part because its primary role is sy mbiotic; critique remains dormant
until the fools begin to dance . At t he same time, as constructionist dis
course is placed into orbit , as it begins to in sinuate itself into the way s
we describe and explain, so does it inv ite alternative forms of action
ne w pa tte rns o f re l atio n ship. In cert a in resp ects , these p atte rns
represent dislocating alternatives to traditions of centuries-long dura
tion. In effect, constructionism harbo rs enorm ous revolutionary
potentia l for our cultural forms of life. In the exploration of this poten
tial, constructionist inquiry moves from a symbiotic to a productive
posture-from deconstruction to reconstruction .
I have said much about these pos it ive outcomes in an earl ier work
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(Gergen, 1999). However, for present purposes, I wish to focus on only
one emerging development, namely that of relational theory and prac
tice. Constructionist dialogues consistently underscore the significance
of relationship as the matrix from which meaning is derived. It is in the
generation of coordinations-of actions, words, objects-that human
meaning is born. In this sense, meaning does not originate in individual
minds but in relationships among persons. To say that "I know" is but a
derivative of what has already been achieved within relationship.I All
that we take to be true of nature and of mind, of self and others, thus
finds its origins within relationship. Or, in Martin Buber's terms, "In the
beginning is the-relationship." It is this line of reasoning that has played
a spirited counterpoint with the conceptual movement from individual to
relational selves (Gergen, 1999) and with the therapeutic movement
away from exploring individual minds and toward co-constructed reali
ties (McNamee and Gergen, 1994). This tum in constructionist thought
is not toward the enunciation of a new truth, that of relationship. Rather,
this tum in sensibilities opens a new space for innovation and transfor
mation.
TOWARD RELATIONAL POLITICS

If these are the implications of the relational metaphor, what are the
implications for identity politics? In my view the potentials are substan
tial. Indeed, I believe that we find here the seeds for both revitalization
and transformation of the most profound variety. Let me cast such a
transformation in terms of relational politics-a politics in which neither
self nor other, we nor them, takes precedence, but in which relational
process serves as the generative source of change. I am not speaking
here of a mere fantasy, another grand but unworkable design hatched in
the ivory tower. Rather, I believe that relational politics are already in
evidence-not altogether self-conscious, but struggling in multiple sites
toward common intelligibility. Here I wish to touch on only three specific
sites of development: the revisioning of self and other, discursive prac
tice, and social action.
RE-THEORIZING SELF AND OTHER

In important degree, identity politics is a descendent of Western, indi
vidualist ideology. It is not the single individual who commands our

interest in this case; rather, individual identity is conflated with group
identity. Individual and group interests (and rights) are one. In this way,
the group replaces the individual as the center of concern, but the dis
course of individuality is not thereby disrupted. Rather, the group is
treated discursively in much the same way as the individual: imbued
with good and evil intent, held blameworthy, deemed worthy of rights,
and so on. In spite of the shift toward the social, we thus inherit the prob
lems of individualism yet once again-simply one step removed. Rather
than a society of isolated and alienated individuals-a potential war of
all against all in the individualist sense-we have a battlefield of antag
onistic groups. As James Hunter (1991) has put it, we are now engaged
in "culture wars."
Advocates of identity politics have become keenly aware of the prob
lematics of separation. As they point out, the dominant culture is already
prone toward objectification of the Other. In du Preez's (1980) terms, the
Other is forced into identity traps that confirm the dominant culture's
sense of superiority and self-righteousness. It is in this light that we can
understand the attempt by black intellectuals to blur the boundaries of
ethnic, sexual and political identity. For example, in Race Matters, Cor
nell West (1993) warns against the delineation of a distinct black culture
and seeks a: "frank acknowledgment of the basic humanness and Ameri
canness of each of us." Similarly, Stanley Crouch (1990), in Notes of a
Hanging Judge, argues that politics must involve African-Americans "not
as outsiders"-a distinct group unto itself-but as participants in broad
ranging enclaves of society, for example as "voters, taxpayers, and sober
thinkers." In a similar vein, Todd Gitlin (1993) speaks of commonality
politics, oriented around understanding differences "against the back
ground of what is not different, what is shared among groups" (p. 173).
These are salutary invitations to subvert the traditional binary and to
reconceptualize self and Other. Given the constructionist shift toward a
relational sensibility, I believe we are poised for just such a revisioning.
We confront the possibility of developing intelligibilities that go beyond
the identification of separable units-I versus you, we versus them-and
that may create reality of relatedness, the palpability of inseparability.
How might a relational intelligibility be articulated? There are several
current attempts to achieve this end, each of which contributes signifi
cantly and differentially to a relational consciousness.
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There is, first, a bustling renaissance of interest in Vygotsky's (1978)
inquiries into cognitive development (see, for example, Wertsch, 1991;
Newman and Holzman, 1997). The significance of this work is largely
owing to its dislodgme11.t of psychology's long-standing investment in
autonomous, or self-contained, cognitive processes, in favor of a pro
foundly more socialized conception of self. For the Vygotskian, to
paraphrase John Locke, there is nothing in thought that is not first in
society. Or, to extend the implications, the concept of the autonomous
agent is a myth: each of us is constituted by the other; we cannot delib
erate or decide without implicating otherness. W hile Vygotskians do
retain a strong interest in individual functioning, more fully relational is
a range of work conceptualizing the self as dialogically constituted (see,
for example, Shotter, 1993; Sampson, 1993a; Hermans and Kempen,
1993). In this case, drawing significantly from Bakhtinian semiotics, the
individual is conceptualized as inseparable from ongoing social process
(with the conversation featured as the dominant metaphor). W ithin this
frame, individual psychological process is typically granted ontological
status but, similar to the Vygotskians, only as a private stand-in for pub
lic conversation.
My own endeavors, perhaps constituting a radical relationalism, have
followed a third route (see Gergen, 1994). My attempt has been to make
intelligible a range of microsocial scenarios, or relational forms in which
individual action derives its sense or meaning from its placement within
the extended interchange. Thus, for example, an expression of anger is
nonsense if isolated from a scenario of relationship. One cannot sensibly
be angry without a preceding action that grants anger meaning as a sup
plement. And once anger is expressed, there is only a limited number of
meaningful moves available to the target (e.g., apology, explanation, hos
tility). If apology is the subsequent move in the dance,,there is only a
limited number of options then rendered plausible as replies. In effect,
actions such as anger and apology gain their meaning from the broader
relational scenario in which they are embedded. Individual bodies may
bear the signifiers into action, but the moves (anger, apology, etc.) are not
thereby possessions of individuals. They are constituents of the rela
tional dance.
These efforts to articulate relational being are in their infancy. We have
yet to fully explore, for example, Davies's and Harre's (1990) conception

of self-positioning, Taylor's (1989) "webs of interlocution" (p. 36), and
Baudrillard's (1994) selves as terminals of multiple networks. Many
moves in the postmodern register also offer fertile sources of rhetorical
enrichment. I think here especially of images of selves as multiple-par
tials, that is, selves as constituted by multiple facets, each reflecting a
different domain of human relationship and each representing but a par
tial aspect of the whole. Here Connolly's (1991) Identity/Difference and
Judith Butler's (1990) Gender Trouble come quickly to mind. In each case
we find a rich range of images that could substantially alter our interpreta
tion of social life. As the reality of relationship becomes increasingly
intelligible, we find substantial implications for future deliberation on
identity politics. To scan the horizons briefly, we _are invited to consider
the possibility that:
• There is no natural (biological, genetic) basis for intergroup antag
onism (as sociobiologists, ethologists, and Freudians are wont to
argue). Violence is a meaningful integer in a relational dance; this
dance is rooted in historical convention and is subject to change
both on the grassroots and policy levels.
• Prejudice does not originate in the individual mind. Prejudicial
action is a meaningful move within a variety of cultural scenarios.
As the scenarios unfold, so is prejudicial action invited. Given a
modicum of participation in the culture (including its mass media),
all of us are capable of such actions. By the same token, we are all
capable of loving, caring, and societally responsible action. All
actions, in effect, are by-products of existing relational forms.
• Identity-whether individual or group-is not derived from the
nature of the world. (There are no necessary or natural distinctions
among persons or groups). Rather, identity is a relational achieve
ment. Individuation (or unitization) is only one of many ways in
which we might describe or explain the world. And such forms of
discourse obscure the more essential domain of human connection.
• There is no means of ultimate victory (politically, economically,
militarily) if winning means eradication of the Other (or the Other's
position). To condemn, excoriate, or wage war against a constructed
Other in our society is inherently self-destructive; for in a funda
mental sense, we are the Other. We are born of our relationship and
derive our sense of identity from relationship.

There is, first, a bustling renaissance of interest in Vygotsky's (1978)
inquiries into cognitive development (see, for example, Wertsch, 1991;
Newman and Holzman, 1997). The significance of this work is largely
owing to its dislodgme11.t of psychology's long-standing investment in
autonomous, or self-contained, cognitive processes, in favor of a pro
foundly more socialized conception of self. For the Vygotskian, to
paraphrase John Locke, there is nothing in thought that is not first in
society. Or, to extend the implications, the concept of the autonomous
agent is a myth: each of us is constituted by the other; we cannot delib
erate or decide without implicating otherness. W hile Vygotskians do
retain a strong interest in individual functioning, more fully relational is
a range of work conceptualizing the self as dialogically constituted (see,
for example, Shotter, 1993; Sampson, 1993a; Hermans and Kempen,
1993). In this case, drawing significantly from Bakhtinian semiotics, the
individual is conceptualized as inseparable from ongoing social process
(with the conversation featured as the dominant metaphor). W ithin this
frame, individual psychological process is typically granted ontological
status but, similar to the Vygotskians, only as a private stand-in for pub
lic conversation.
My own endeavors, perhaps constituting a radical relationalism, have
followed a third route (see Gergen, 1994). My attempt has been to make
intelligible a range of microsocial scenarios, or relational forms in which
individual action derives its sense or meaning from its placement within
the extended interchange. Thus, for example, an expression of anger is
nonsense if isolated from a scenario of relationship. One cannot sensibly
be angry without a preceding action that grants anger meaning as a sup
plement. And once anger is expressed, there is only a limited number of
meaningful moves available to the target (e.g., apology, explanation, hos
tility). If apology is the subsequent move in the dance,,there is only a
limited number of options then rendered plausible as replies. In effect,
actions such as anger and apology gain their meaning from the broader
relational scenario in which they are embedded. Individual bodies may
bear the signifiers into action, but the moves (anger, apology, etc.) are not
thereby possessions of individuals. They are constituents of the rela
tional dance.
These efforts to articulate relational being are in their infancy. We have
yet to fully explore, for example, Davies's and Harre's (1990) conception

of self-positioning, Taylor's (1989) "webs of interlocution" (p. 36), and
Baudrillard's (1994) selves as terminals of multiple networks. Many
moves in the postmodern register also offer fertile sources of rhetorical
enrichment. I think here especially of images of selves as multiple-par
tials, that is, selves as constituted by multiple facets, each reflecting a
different domain of human relationship and each representing but a par
tial aspect of the whole. Here Connolly's (1991) Identity/Difference and
Judith Butler's (1990) Gender Trouble come quickly to mind. In each case
we find a rich range of images that could substantially alter our interpreta
tion of social life. As the reality of relationship becomes increasingly
intelligible, we find substantial implications for future deliberation on
identity politics. To scan the horizons briefly, we _are invited to consider
the possibility that:
• There is no natural (biological, genetic) basis for intergroup antag
onism (as sociobiologists, ethologists, and Freudians are wont to
argue). Violence is a meaningful integer in a relational dance; this
dance is rooted in historical convention and is subject to change
both on the grassroots and policy levels.
• Prejudice does not originate in the individual mind. Prejudicial
action is a meaningful move within a variety of cultural scenarios.
As the scenarios unfold, so is prejudicial action invited. Given a
modicum of participation in the culture (including its mass media),
all of us are capable of such actions. By the same token, we are all
capable of loving, caring, and societally responsible action. All
actions, in effect, are by-products of existing relational forms.
• Identity-whether individual or group-is not derived from the
nature of the world. (There are no necessary or natural distinctions
among persons or groups). Rather, identity is a relational achieve
ment. Individuation (or unitization) is only one of many ways in
which we might describe or explain the world. And such forms of
discourse obscure the more essential domain of human connection.
• There is no means of ultimate victory (politically, economically,
militarily) if winning means eradication of the Other (or the Other's
position). To condemn, excoriate, or wage war against a constructed
Other in our society is inherently self-destructive; for in a funda
mental sense, we are the Other. We are born of our relationship and
derive our sense of identity from relationship.

• Societal transformation is not a matter of changing minds and hearts,
political values, or the sense of the good. Rather, transformation will
require unleashing the positive potential inherent in relational
process. In effect, we must locate a range of relational forms that
enable collective transformation as opposed to alienated dissocia
tion. This latter point will become amplified in what follows.
TOWARD RELATIONAL DISCOURSE

In addition to the development of new conceptions of self and Other
with its associated array of provocative logics-relational politics invites
the exploration of alternative modes of talking/acting with others, and
particularly those with whom we otherwise disagree. This is not because
we require prettier, sharper, or more sophisticated words in which to
wrap the case. I am not speaking here of "knockdown arguments" or a
"better spin." Rather, discourse is important because it is itself con
stituent of relationship. As social action, discourse serves to form and
sustain our forms of relationship; a shift in mode of speaking or writing
stands as an invitation to alter the character of relationship. Here we
have glimpsed some of the ways in which traditional rhetorics-for
exaniple, claims to truth, claims to moral authority, and critical attack
function to alienate, antagonize, and escalate conflict. An effective
relational politics requires, then, a poetic leap into new forms of dis
course and, more specifically, forms that invite broader opportunities for
mutual sustanence. Or as David Goldberg (1993) puts it, required is a
new range of incorporative metaphors, not, in this case for purposes of the
cretical development, but serviceable in the hurly-burly of daily
interchange.
It is in this context that a number of colleagues have joined Sheila
McNamee and me (McNamee and Gergen, 1999) to explore the poten
tials of relationally responsible discourse. ,As reasoned in this case, if we
place a value on the process of meaning-making-essentially that
process without which there would be no domain of political value-then
our attention is drawn to forms of discourse that sustain as opposed to
subvert this process. In what ways can we speak, it is asked, such that
our capacities for the productive (as opposed to destructive) generation
of meaning are sustained? In our view, one major discursive ritual that
often destroys the grounds for sustained interchange is that of individual

blame. When the discourse of blame is set in motion, the target is typi
cally degraded, set apart from the community of the good, and thus
alienated from it. In the process of blame, the vast sea of complexity in
which any action is submerged is denied, and the single individual
serves as its sole origin. In terms of relational responsibility, the chal
lenge is that of locating alternative forms of discourse that can serve as
replacements for the ritual of blame and recrimination. How else can we
talk under such conditions that might serve the ends of altering or termi
nating the unwanted action but simultaneously sustain a relationship of
mutual respect?
While the aforementioned volume (McNamee and Gergen, 1999) is
focally concerned with this issue, one of the options is of special relevance
to moving from an identity to a relational politics. As we saw, many onetime
identity politics advocates are moving away from rhetorics of antagonism
and separation to articulate visions of unity. This is a move highly congenial
to a relational politics. The discursive shift from me versus you to we has
enormous consequences for political process. The construction of separa
tion gives way to one of shared investments. In our discussion of relational
responsibility, we treat this move in terms of "crafting conjoint relations."
All units of social life-from the individual person to the community and
nation state-are relational constructions. They typically require conversa
tional coordination to bring them into recognition as units. Thus, wherever
there is antagonism-the recognition of me versus you-we confront the
opportunity of creating a transcendent discourse of the we. To replace the
ritual of blame, a relationally responsible inquiry might be launched into
how the untoward act has been jointly achieved. How did we together create
a situation in which an intolerable act has resulted? Not only does such
inquiry enable participants to remain creatively connected, but so are new
lineS"of inquiry opened. It is not simply that the single individual must "cor
rect his ways," but rather, there is an exploration of cooperative
opportunities.
Let me illustrate in a homely way: several years ago Mary and I were
driving on a dangerous cliffside road in southern Europe. The rain was
pelting, visibility was minimal, the traffic was treacherous, and we were
late for an appointment. We were both highly tense, and as my driving
was less than flawless, Mary became increasingly critical, and I became
increasingly irritated and resentful of her blame. Soon it was not only the
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our capacities for the productive (as opposed to destructive) generation
of meaning are sustained? In our view, one major discursive ritual that
often destroys the grounds for sustained interchange is that of individual

blame. When the discourse of blame is set in motion, the target is typi
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and separation to articulate visions of unity. This is a move highly congenial
to a relational politics. The discursive shift from me versus you to we has
enormous consequences for political process. The construction of separa
tion gives way to one of shared investments. In our discussion of relational
responsibility, we treat this move in terms of "crafting conjoint relations."
All units of social life-from the individual person to the community and
nation state-are relational constructions. They typically require conversa
tional coordination to bring them into recognition as units. Thus, wherever
there is antagonism-the recognition of me versus you-we confront the
opportunity of creating a transcendent discourse of the we. To replace the
ritual of blame, a relationally responsible inquiry might be launched into
how the untoward act has been jointly achieved. How did we together create
a situation in which an intolerable act has resulted? Not only does such
inquiry enable participants to remain creatively connected, but so are new
lineS"of inquiry opened. It is not simply that the single individual must "cor
rect his ways," but rather, there is an exploration of cooperative
opportunities.
Let me illustrate in a homely way: several years ago Mary and I were
driving on a dangerous cliffside road in southern Europe. The rain was
pelting, visibility was minimal, the traffic was treacherous, and we were
late for an appointment. We were both highly tense, and as my driving
was less than flawless, Mary became increasingly critical, and I became
increasingly irritated and resentful of her blame. Soon it was not only the

road we had to fear, but ourselves. After a breathtaking near-collision, I
pulled the car over to the side of the road so we could collect ourselves.
Here we decided to reconceptualize the drive. Rather than defining me
as "the driver" and her as the "endangered passenger," we decided it
would be better to share the roles. We would drive and we would criticize
together. She became an added pair of eyes on the road; I developed a
self-critical posture, The results were gratifying; not only did we avoid
shredding our relationship hut we lived to tell the tale.
On a more general scale, however, with the flourishing of a discourse
of conjoint relations we confront the possibility that political parties
could desist in blaming each other for various governmental or social
failings. As many see it, the ritual of mutual recrimination has under
mined the potentials for effective policy-making at the national level.
Virtually all preferences in one political party are automatically targets
of critique by the opposing party; virtually all claims to achievement are
degraded; all failings are traced to origins in the opposition. With the
shift toward conjoint realities we open a space for alternative conversa
tions. How have "we together" created the conditions of failure; how
have these achievements been jointly wrought; and is it possible that dif
fering preferences can be conjoined in new and creative ways? A
relational politics need not obscure or eradicate differences; however,
there is much to be gained by seeing these differences as derived from
relational process as opposed to independent origins. We have scarcely
tapped the possibilities for "actionable" vocabularies of relational
responsibility; the future remains open. Let us finally tum to more direct
forms of political action.
THE POLITICS OF RELATIONAL PRACTICE

A transformation in theoretical resources and discursive practices is
scarcely sufficient. Most acutely needed are innovative form s of political
action. In my view, one of the most significant innovations derived from
the identity politics movement was to broaden extensively the arena of
the political. In particular, political practice ceased to be reserved for
the arena of politics formally considered-campaigning, voting, office
holding, and so on-and it ceased to be hierarchical, with the flow
moving from the top echelons down to the grass roots. Rather, the doing
of politics became everyone's business in the arenas of the local and the

immediate-in the streets, the classrooms, business, and so on. Further,
as we have slowly learned, particularly from feminist activists, there are
no everyday activities that are not political in implication-from the car
toons our children watch to our purchase of shampoo and shirts. In this
sense, political action does not require either aggressive championing of
specific agendas or party partisanship to be effective. It seems to me that
the future of relational politics might promisingly be shaped by conjoin
ing these realizations: we may view relational politics as defused (in
terms of a reduction in aggressive or hegemonic pursuits) and diffused
(in terms of an expansion into all forms of relationship). Politics in the
relational mode may be subtle, fluid, and unceasing-not the work of
specific groups on specific sites identified as "political," but the work of
us all, in all relationships.
My special concern here is with forms of practice informed by or con
genial with the relational tum in constructionist theory. How can we
move from argumentation, agitation, and litigation to ordinary but
unceasing forms of mutually sustaining activity? What forms of practice
may he generated that move away from isolation and insulation and
toward the cross-fertilization of identities, the intermingling of practices,
the interweaving of selves, and ever-broadening forms of coordinated
action? I do think such practices are possible, and, indeed, there are
numerous instances of just such innovation. The constructionist move in
therapy has successfully shifted the focus from defective individuals to
relational processes. The shift is away from who or what is defective, to
how it is we come to interpret life patterns as defective and what alterna
tive forms of construction may enable relations to proceed more
congenially. Therapy, then, is not intent on locating evil (disease, dys
function) and correcting it, but on coordinating meanings within
relationships such that the discourse of evil is rendered obsolete. In the
case of education, we discussed newly emerging practices of collabora
tive learning, critical reflection, polyvocal literacy, and dialogic
evaluation. Again, I see such practices as relational politics in action.
There is principally no limit to the forms of action that can be gener
ated in the service of relational politics. Every form of human
coordination offers opportunities for innovation. However, a few con
certed attempts-among them some of my favorites-will round out the
discussion.
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Community-Focused Institutes

I am deeply impressed by the activities of many therapeutically ori
ented institutes to move outward into community work-not in the name
of a specific political advocacy, but for purposes of crossing boundaries
of divided discourse and value. Prominent, for example, is the work of
Sallyann Roth and Laura and Richard Chasin and their colleagues at the
Public Conv�rsations Project (Chasin and Herzig, 1992), where the
attempt has been to bring together leaders from warring ideological
camps-for example, pro-choice and pro-life, or straights and gays. The
purpose of these interchanges is not to champion one cause over the
other, not to impugn the intelligibility of either tradition or to dismiss the
conflict. Rather, by suppressing varioii� forms of divisive rhetoric and
simultaneously giving voice to narratives of lived. experience ("my expe
rience with abortion," "what it is like for me to be gay"), the attempt is to
open a way of incorporating the Other, of appreciating the situated char
acter of the perspectives in question. No, the ideological conflict is not
thereby dissolved, but the outcome appears to be far more humane
modes of relating to the Other. I also think here of the impressive work of
Fred Newman and Lois Holzman (Newman and Holzman, 1996, 1997)
and their colleagues at the East Side Institute for Short Term Psy
chotherapy in Manhattan.2 Going far beyond therapeutic practice, the
institute helps ghetto youth to organize talent shows, offers public dia
logues between blacks and Jews, and has run a multiracial elementary
school in Harlem. Even those who seek treatment in therapy are encour
aged to join in community action. Such action may be political and
specifically of the kind that might alter the conditions responsible in cre
ating their problems.
Appreciative Inquiry

In the domain of organizational management, David Cooperrider
(1990) and his colleagues at Case Western Reserve have developed a
form of organizational intervention called appreciative inquiry. W hen
organizations confront conflict-between management and workers, men
and women, blacks and whites, and so on-appreciative inquiry shifts
the focus from who is right and wrong, fostering tolerance, or developing
rules of proper conduct, to modes of collaborative action. More specifi
cally, the attempt is to work with the organization to locate instances of

desirable or ideal relations-cases in which groups work well and effec
tively with each other. Further, as these appreciated instances are
brought into public consciousness, the organization is brought into dis
cussion of the kind of future it might build around such cases. In the very
process of instancing the positive and forging an image of a desirable
future, the divisive constructions lose their suasive capacity. This orien
tation to positive collaboration has also been extended to processes of
community-building, interreligous integration, education, elder care,
police training, and more.3 And, under the direction of Bliss Brown and
her colleagues, citizens of Chicago are being united to create a new
future together. Their program, Imagine Chicago, has fostered apprecia
tive and growth-directed dialogue not only within numerous Chicago
communities but across diverse economic and ethnic groups.4
These relational innovations have been party to constructionist dia
logues. However, there are additional movements of note, which are not
so much informed by relational conceptions as they are congenial. Here
I would include the enormous growth over the past decade of private
voluntary organizations-grassroots organizations devoted to humane
and life-giving practices. There are now some 20,000 of these organiza
tions operating on a transnational basis, coordinating participants from
around the globe in reducing hunger, curing disease, controlling AIDS,
saving the environment, helping children to survive, and so on. As
Cooperrider and Dutton (1999) propose, there are "no limits to global
cooperation." The mushrooming of virtual communities on the Internet
also represents a potential contribution to relational politics. There are
now almost five million users of the Internet, a large proportion of
whom take part in small, loosely linked communities of meaning. Cut
ting across racial, ethnic, age, ·gender, geographical, and religious lines,
such communities enable dialogue on innumerable issues, both pro
found and personal. I am also impressed with the attempt toward full
ecumenicalism among world religions, as realized, for example, in the
recent Parliament of World Religions. This meeting, in Chicago,
brought together 8,000 people from 150 faiths around the globe into
mutual inquiry. In each of these cases, the signifiers cross boundaries
and begin to play in new arenas.
In conclusion, I do not wish to abandon the existing tradition of iden
tity politics, the discourses of oppression, justice, equality, rights, and so
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on, nor the in-yourface activism that we have come to know so well.5 The
point is not to eradicate existing vocabularies of action. Rather, my hope
is that we are now participating in the generation of a new vocabulary, a
new consciousness, and a new range of practices-a relational politics
that will be incorporative, pervasive, collaborative, and unceasing. As
lesbian feminist Shane Phelan (1989) proposed, "identity politics must
be based not only on identity, but on an appreciation for politics as the
art of living together" (p. 170). Relational politics is precisely the
attempt to realize this art.

NOTES

1. For a sharpening of the issues, see Chapter 11 in Gergen, 1994.
2. Also see http://www.EastSidelnstitute.org.
3. For ongoing discussion of these applications and extensions, consult the
news group by writing to www.appreciative-inquiry.org.
4. See also http://�.imaginechicago.org.
5 See Sampson, 1993b, for a positive account of traditional identity politics
at work.
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and Epistemology
Lenora Fulani

As AN AFRICAN-AMERICAN child growing up in Chester, Pennsylvania,

I (not surprisingly) never heard the word epistemology, rarely heard the
word identity, and frequently heard the word race. My race faced mis
treatment, poverty, and poor education, and I decided that I was going
to become a psychologist so that I could help people and so that
together we could change the world. As an undergraduate I was imme
diately disappointed by what psychology had to offer, and disturbed
(outraged, really) by the official assessment of the African-American
community as a tangle of pathology. I soon became a militant Black
Nationalist and immersed myself in black psychology. I still never
heard anyone speak about epistemology, although just about everyone
was talking about race, and we nationalists spoke about identity all the
time. I rapidly developed one.
It was becoming a political activist, a Marxist, a social therapist, and
a builder of a multiracial development community 1 that taught me about
epistemology and its links to race and identity. Having learned what it is,
I strongly urge that we get rid of it! In the following remarks, I will share
some of what this has looked like in my work and, I hope, give some
sense of the power there is in giving it up, especially (though not exclu
sively) for young people of color.
In The End of Knowing: A New Developmental Way of Learning, my
colleagues Fred Newman and Lois Holzman provoke us into taking a
hard look not just at so-called modernist epistemology and its oppressive
and conservatizing force upon us, but at all ways of knowing, including
some of the current postmodern alternatives (Newman and Holzman,
1997). To them, the problem we human beings face at this moment in
history is our epistemic posture-whether individuated, social, cultural,

